Editorial practices revolving around tests of statistical significance are explored. The logic of statistical significance testing is presented in an accessible manner--many people who use statistical tests Might r.,)t place such a premium on them if they knew what the tests really do, and what they do not do. The etiology of decades of misuse of statistical tests is explored, highlighting the bad implicit logic of persons who misuse statistical tests. Finally, three revised editorial policies that would improve conventional practice are discussed. The first is the use of better language, with insistence on universal use of the phrase "statistical significance" to emphasize that the common meaning of "significant" has nothing to do with results being important. A second improvement would be emphasizing effect size interpretation, and a third would be using and reporting strategies that evaluate the replicability of results. Internal replicability analyses such as cross validation, the jackknife, or the bootstrap would help determine whether results are stable across sample variations. (Contains 51 references.)
would be in a position to discredit the results by saying that they were the product of the way the ball bounces. (Melton, 1962, p. 554) The shift of emphasis toward effect size and replicability Cohen, 1990 Cohen, , 1994 Kupfersmid, 1988; Rosenthal, 1991; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989) .
Of course, these views are hardly new. A few especially noteworthy among the numerous efforts "to exorcise the null hypothesis" (Cronbach, 1975, p. 124 ) over the past 35 years have been works by Rozeboom (1960) , Morrison and Henkel (1970), Carver (1978) , Meehl (1978) , Shaver (1985) , Oakes (1986) , and J. Cohen (1994 (Huberty, 1987 Unfortunately, very few researchers seem to understand what their R calculated values actually evaluate (Carver, 1978) . Put Editorial Policies -6-Isuccinctly, 110 CALCULATED iS the probability (0 to 1.0) of the sample -statistics, given the sample size, and assuming the sample was derived from a population in which the null hypothesis (H0) is exactly true (Thompson, 1994a) . The computation of PCALCULATED in a particular study includes consideration of three elements: (a) the results in the sample (i.e., the sample "statistics") vis a vis the null hypothesis (i.e., sample means, medians, standard deviations, or whatever a given null hypothesis is about); (b) the related results in the population (i.e., the population "parameters") vis a vis the null hypothesis (i.e., population means, medians, standard deviations, or whatever a given null hypothesis is about);
and (c) the sample size.
For example, let's presume a researcher has a sample of scores on a reading ability test (X) for two groups of subjects, and wants to test whether the "spreadoutness" of the scores in the two groups is equal.
Perhaps in group one SDx is 3, and in group two SDx is 5.
The researcher wants to know the probability of obtaining Therefore, since a sample deviation from equality would be more likely with a small sample of six people in each group, the PCALCULATED for these statistics for this sample size would be larger.
But as sample size got larger for the same statistics One serious problem with this statistical testing logic is that the in reality Ho is never true in the population, as recognized by any number of prominent statisticians (Tukey, 1991), i.e., there will always be some differences in population parameters, although the differences may be incredibly trivial.
Near 40 years ago Savage (1957, pp. 332-333) noted that, "Null hypotheses of no difference are usually known to be false before the data are collected." Subsequently, Meehl (1978, p. 822) argued, "As I believe is generally recognized by statisticians today and by thoughtful social scientists, the null hypothesis, taken literally, is always false." Similarly, noted statistician Hays (1981, p. 293) pointed out that " [t] here is surely nothing on earth that is completely independent of anything else.
The strength of association may approach zero, but it should seldom or never be exactly zero." And Loftus and Loftus (1982, pp. 498-499) argued that, "finding a '[statistically] significant effect' really provides very little information, because it's almost certain that some relationship (however small) exists between any two variables."
The very important implication of all this is that statistical significance testing primarily becomes only a test of researcher endurance, because "virtually any study can be made to show
[statistically] significant results if one uses enough subjects" (Hays, 1981, p. 293 2. The ("C") statistics for future samples drawn from the same population will approximate the ("B") population parameters (minor premise); so therefore, 3. The initial ("A") sample statistics will be replicated in the form of the ("C") statistics for future samples drawn from the same population (conclusion).
Their is no error in the deductive logic itself yielding the conclusion in this syllogism, since if "A"="B", and if "B"="C", then "A" does lead to "C". Nor is the minor premise of the syllogism incorrect. (Thompson, 1987 (Thompson, , 1988 Empirical science in inescapably a subjective business. As Berger and Berry (1988) argued, "objectivity is not generally possible in statistics" (p. 165). Huberty and Morris (1988, p. 573) concurred, noting that "As in all of statistical inference, subjective judgment cannot be avoided. Neither can reasonableness!"
Three Recommendations for Improved Editorial Policy
In evaluating statistical practices it is important to avoid making what in logic is termed an "is/ought" or a "should/would" error (Hudson, 1969; Hume, 1957) . As Strike (1979) explained,
To deduce a proposition with an "ought" in it from premises containing only "is" assertions is to get something in the conclusion not contained in the premises, something impossible in a valid deductive argument. (p. 13)
The fact that many researchers "are" now inappropriately using tests of statistical significance does not necessarily mean that researchers "ought" to abandon statistical tests.
However, various improvements in practice can certainly be recommended.
For example, if researchers feel they must invoke statistical tests, then tests presuming null hypotheses of no garnered with a small sample size), but the interpretation of effect sizes would equally well (and more directly) cue the researcher regarding the noteworthiness of such anomalous results.
Continued obsession with statistical significance would maintain current editorial practices favoring articles that report statistically significant outcomes (Rosenthal, 1979) . The "file drawer" problem (Atkinson, Furlong & Wampold, 1982; L.H. Cohen, 1979; Greenwald, 1975) does create a fortunate bias against reports of Type II errors, since by definition statistically significant results cannot represent Type II errors. However, the bias toward statistically significant findings also creates a mentality where power is not reported (Olejnik, 1984) and is low (Woolley, 1983) (Clark, 1976, p. 258) . Greenwald (1975, pp. 13-15) cites actual examples of such findings, the horrors of which Lindquist (1953, pp. 68-70 ) discussed some 40 years ago.
In any case, certain improvements in statistical routines should now be recognized as "best practice" by AERA editors, program chairs, and reviewers. At least three reforms should become explicit elements of AERA editorial practices.
Use of Better Language
If researchers are unable to report merely that they elected to reject a null hypothesis, such results ought to always be described as "statistically significant", and should never be described only as "significant." The universal use of the phrase, "statistically significant," might facilitate the recognition that the common meaning associated with "significant" has absolutely nothing to do with results being important (Carver, 1993) Alternatively, since all analyses are correlational (cf. Knapp, 1978; Thompson, 1991) , variance-accounted-for effect sizes can be computed in all studies. Either uncorrected effect sizes (e.g., R2, eta2) can be interpreted, or these can be corrected (e.g., omega2, adjusted R2) for the positive bias associated with (a) smaller sample sizes, (b) using more variables, and/or (c) smaller population effects. Snyder and Lawson (1993) present an understandable treatment of the choices.
Evaluating Result Replicabilitv
If science is the business of discovering replicable effects, because statistical significance tests do not evaluate result replicability, then researchers should use and report some strategies that do evaluate the replicability of their results.
Obviously, the only direct evaluation of result replicability is the so-called "external" replication (i.e., actual replication with a new sample). However, most researchers lack the stamina to conduct all their studies at least twice.
Researchers who find it difficult to replicate all their studies can use "internal" replicability analyses for this purpose.
Such logics include using cross-validation, the jackknife, and/or the bootstrap. Thompson (1993 Thompson ( , 1994b And the 1994 author guidelines for Educational and Psychological
Measurement require authors to report and interpret effect sizes, and strongly encourage authors to report actual "externa)"
replication studies, or to conduct "internal" replicabilitr analyses.
